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"PURIFYING POLITICS": ILLINOIS KNOW NOTHINGS
AND THE PERPLEXITIES OF THE PARANOID STYLE
I AN I VERSON
In the wake of the heated 1964 Presidential Campaign, the historian
and public intellectual Richard Hofstadter reflected on a pattern in American
politics that he termed the “paranoid style.” Hofstadter argued that
throughout American history, various groups on the margins of the political
community had made their case to the nation in “[o]verheated,
oversuspicious, overaggressive, grandiose, and apocalyptic” terms and
explained the nation’s problems in terms of a grand conspiracy that
threatened to subvert American government and culture.1 Seeing themselves
as “unselfish and patriotic,” the practitioners of the paranoid style often
indulged in a “feeling of righteousness” and espoused an intense “moral
indignation.”2
In the mid-nineteenth century, the United States featured abundant
variations on the paranoid style as outré conspiracies forced their way into
mainstream thought. In the slaveholding South, the most vociferous
defenders of the “peculiar institution” described an abolitionist conspiracy, a
plot by Northerners and foreigners to agitate otherwise submissive enslaved
people and trigger an uprising reminiscent of the Haitian Revolution. In a
variation on this theme, some pro-compromise conservatives, especially in
the slaveholding border states, argued that sectional extremists in both the
North and the South conspired to subvert the Constitution and bring about an
end to the American experiment by agitating questions over slavery.3
Throughout the Northern states on the other hand, two distinct
conspiracy theories gained traction as new political parties competed to fill
the void left by the demise of the once powerful Whig Party. Some members
of the new Republican Party became proponents of the “Slave Power
Conspiracy” and argued that a small number of Southern slaveholders had
subverted American liberty by taking control of the federal government and
1

RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 4 (1965).
2
Id.
3
This characterization of a “Disunion” conspiracy draws heavily on the work of
Elizabeth R. Varon. See ELIZABETH R. VARON, DISUNION!: THE COMING OF THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1789-1859, at 9, 10 (2008).
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had imposed policies on the country that benefited elite slaveholders at the
expense of common whites. As an alternative, others in the new Know
Nothing Party pointed to a Catholic or so-called “Papal” conspiracy. They
insisted that the German and Irish Catholics who flocked to America’s shores
were the agents of a plot orchestrated by the autocratic Roman Pontiff. By
their account, the Pope hoped that these ignorant peasants, under the direction
of crafty Jesuits and other priests, would snuff out Protestantism, republican
government, and enlightened individualism in order to restore the
superstitious despotism of the Dark Ages.
The ubiquity, in the 1850s, of conspiracy-thinking and of the
“paranoid style” presents students of American democracy with a problem.
Even as contemporary scholars firmly reject the Know Nothings’ baseless
accusations of a Papal plot, historians have increasingly seen the “Slave
Power” as a real force in antebellum American political life, citing ample
evidence that slaveholding Democrats wielded disproportionate power in
American politics. 4 The interplay, in Northern politics, between the
Republican Party’s conspiracy rhetoric and that of the Know Nothings
demands further attention from scholars. The fact that most Northern Know
Nothings eventually entered the Republican Party and that nativist voters sent
Abraham Lincoln to the White House raises important questions for our own
moment. Can the “paranoid style” serve noble causes as well as iniquitous
ones? To what extent can (and should) political coalitions welcome in those
who hold views many see as reprehensible? The history of the 1850s does
not offer clear answers to these dilemmas, but in examining the ideology and
political trajectory of the Know Nothings in the crucial battleground state of
Illinois, we learn how past national leaders molded public opinion and
worked around the prejudices of the electorate to address critical issues of
the day.
I.

THE CRISIS OF 1854

In 1854, the United States faced an unprecedented crisis as the two
political parties that had long dominated national affairs, the Whigs and
Democrats, fractured in the face of popular outrage. Long united by their
support for, or opposition to, economic measures such as a national bank, a
protective tariff, and federal funding for internal improvements, the parties
4

See LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER: THE FREE NORTH AND
SOUTHERN DOMINATION, 1780-1860 (2000); MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE:
A HISTORY OF ABOLITION (2016); JAMES OAKES, THE CROOKED PATH TO
ABOLITION: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTION (2021).
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now disintegrated and split into factions as the county became embroiled in
a renewed struggle over the extension of slavery and the role of immigrants
in American society. Both issues had produced controversy earlier in the
American republic’s brief history, but their combined resurgence at this
juncture posed new challenges for the nation.5
In January, Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas had introduced a bill
to organize the new territories of Kansas and Nebraska as part of his effort to
clear a Midwestern route for a transcontinental railroad. Under pressure from
Southern senators in his own Democratic party, Douglas included in the bill
a stipulation that the settlers of the new territories would decide for
themselves whether or not to allow slavery to exist within their borders. This
adoption of this principle, known contemporaneously as “popular
sovereignty,” in these territories marked a repeal of the Missouri
Compromise of 1820 that had prohibited slavery north of the latitude 36° 30’.
The bill provoked a swift backlash throughout the free states as many
Northerners denounced the measure as a cowardly surrender to Southern
interests and a repudiation of a “sacred national compact.” In the final vote
on the bill, Northern Whigs stood steadfastly against the proposed law while
most Southern Whigs supported the measure. Among Democrats, although
most Northern representatives stayed true to Douglas and voted with their
Southern compatriots in favor of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, a key minority in
Congress defected and many more Northern Democratic party activists and
voters denounced the bill as a betrayal of ordinary Northern white men.6
Simultaneously, a new political entity emerged throughout the
country. Known to most as the Know Nothings, this organization had grown
out of secret societies, such as the Order of the Star Spangled Banner, that
had appeared throughout the Northeast in reaction to the swelling tide of
5
For a discussion of the nativist views of the Federalist Party and the Alien Act
of 1798, see Roger M. Smith, Constructing American National Identity: Strategies
of the Federalists, in DORON S. BEN-ATAR & BARBARA B. OBERG, FEDERALISTS
RECONSIDERED 19–40 (1998). For disputes over slavery’s extension in the era of the
early republic see MATTHEW MASON, SLAVERY & POLITICS IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2006) and JOHN CRAIG HAMMOND, SLAVERY, FREEDOM, AND
EXPANSION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN WEST (2006).
6
ROBERT W. JOHANNSEN, THE FRONTIER, THE UNION, AND STEPHEN A.
DOUGLAS 77–102 (1989); JAMES L. HUTSON, STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS AND THE
DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY 100, 101 (2007). See also, ALICE ELIZABETH
MALAVASIC, THE F-STREET MESS: HOW SOUTHERN SENATORS REWROTE THE
KANSAS-NEBRASKA ACT (2017).
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immigration to the United States. From 1845 to 1854, an unprecedented 2.9
million immigrants entered the United States. Previous waves of immigrants
had consisted mostly of middle-class English-speaking Protestants who
quickly assimilated into their adopted country. Many of the relatively poor
Irish and German newcomers, on the other hand, spoke foreign tongues and
practiced Roman Catholicism. A combination of socioeconomic tension,
religious prejudice, and cultural antipathy inspired a backlash throughout the
country. Committed to limiting the influx of newcomers and minimizing
their political influence, the Know Nothings sought to extend the
naturalization period for recent immigrants from five years to twenty-one
years and bar foreign-born citizens from holding public office. Throughout
the country, but especially in the North, thousands rushed to join the new
organization and pledged to support its candidates in the upcoming midterm
elections.7
Looking back from the twenty-first century, these two events appear
unrelated and somewhat contradictory. Popular memory of the Civil War era
and contemporary social movements might lead us to believe that the
opponents of slavery’s extension supported a universal human right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, while nativists stood opposed to the
essential truth that “all men are created equal.” We should not fault ourselves
for recognizing the underlying antagonism between the two movements, as
contemporaries also saw the two impulses as contradictory. In 1855,
Abraham Lincoln, reflecting on the political turmoil that had thrown his own
political identity as a Whig into question, wrote:
I am not a Know-Nothing. That is certain. How could I be?
How can any one who abhors the oppression of negroes, be
in favor of degrading classes of white people? Our progress
in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid. As a nation,
we begin by declaring that "all men are created equal." We
now practically read it "all men are created equal, except
negroes." When the Know-Nothings get control, it will read
"all men are created equal, except negroes, and foreigners,
and catholics." When it comes to this I should prefer
7

As many as one in three Irish immigrants throughout this period spoke only
Gaelic and approximately ninety percent of this generation of Irish immigrants were
Roman Catholics. Although Lutherans, Moravians, and Calvinists did compose a
sizable proportion of the German immigrant population, by the 1850s German
Catholics outnumbered their Protestant compatriots in America. See TYLER
ANBINDER, NATIVISM & SLAVERY 3–8 (1992).

2022]

“Purifying Politics”: Illinois Know Nothings

461

emigrating to some country where they make no pretence of
loving liberty-to Russia, for instance, where despotism can
be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocracy.8
Nevertheless, as Lincoln recognized, a key constituency within his home
state of Illinois held anti-extensionist and nativist views simultaneously.
Although somewhat bewildering from our perspective, these voters felt that
their convictions complemented one another.
Ideologically committed to maintaining a well-ordered, culturally
homogenous, and “progressive” society, anti-extensionist nativists perceived
aggression from Southern slaveholders and Catholic foreigners as twin
threats to republican liberty. As succinctly captured by the historian Luke
Ritter, “nativists saw independence, individualism, and Protestantism as
historically and inseparably linked.” 9 Both slaveholders and Roman
Catholics undermined democratic government, free labor capitalism, and
public virtue by promoting autocracy, hindering education, and indulging
intemperate desires. They believed that slaveholders and their foreign-born
lackeys, through the corrupt organ of the Democratic Party, sought to “stop
and hinder all manly and religious development and to plant the whole earth
with slavery, ruin, and concubinage.” Given to apocalyptic hyperbole, antiextensionist nativists undoubtedly engaged in the paranoid style. Indulging
in, as Hofstadter put it, “heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and
conspiratorial fantasy,” the Know Nothings practiced a politics of alternative
reality that continues to the present day. In their ferocious denunciations of
immigrants and the Roman Catholics, the Know Nothings displayed the
intolerance we associate with today’s practitioners of the paranoid style. Still,
it would be a mistake to dismiss the Know Nothings as merely bigots.
Throughout the North, nativist voters would eventually evolve into Lincoln
supporters.10
Illinois serves as an especially insightful a case study. More than just
the home of the two most notable Northern politicians of the era, Stephen A.
Douglas and Lincoln, the “Prairie State” also captures the economic
dynamism and demographic upheaval of this period throughout the North.
Both Lincoln and Douglas abhorred nativism as rank prejudice, yet,
8

Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Joshua Speed (August 24, 1855), in 2 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 323 (Roy Basler ed.,1953).
9
LUKE RITTER, INVENTING AMERICA’S FIRST IMMIGRATION CRISIS: POLITICAL
NATIVISM IN THE ANTEBELLUM WEST 66 (2021).
10
Id. WKLY. CAP. ENTER. (Springfield, IL), Sept. 23, 1854; HOFSTADTER, supra
note 1, at 3, 19–23 (1965).
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eventually, both men recognized that they would need to appeal to a least
some nativist voters to win a majority in the state. A pivotal battleground
state in national elections, Illinois in the mid-1850s sat at the heart of a region
rapidly transforming from a homogenous and locally oriented frontier zone
into a heterogeneous and market-oriented “heartland.” These changes proved
both exhilarating and terrifying. On the one hand, most Illinoisans seemed
ready to set aside the divisive economic questions of decades past to join in
hands to build up their state as the core of the “Great West” with its
metropolis at Chicago. By facilitating the rise of railroads and banks, the twin
engines of economic development, the state’s political leaders hoped to
secure prosperity for their citizens and power for themselves. Stephen A.
Douglas had hoped that his bid to secure an eastern terminus for the
transcontinental railroad in Illinois would invigorate his state and boost his
own national reputation. But in single-mindedly pursuing this goal, Douglas
overlooked how other changes occurring across the Prairie State and nation
fractured the existing political order beyond repair.11

II.

POLITICAL NATIVISM AND ANTI-CATHOLICISM

The political inferno ignited by the Kansas-Nebraska Act further
inflamed Illinois's cultural divisions, lately amplified by an increasingly
diverse ethnic makeup. The state’s earliest settlers, “Butternut” migrants
from Virginia and Kentucky, dominated Southern Illinois. These hardscrabble frontiersmen and their dependents usually subscribed to a
backwoods variant of the Calvinism their ancestors had brought with them
from Ulster and Scotland. With predestination as their watchword, they
perceived moral reform efforts as intrusive and misguided, an offense to
God’s sovereignty. The “Yankees,” who migrated in increasing numbers
from greater New England throughout the 1840s and 1850s, carried the zeal
for Christian perfectionism sparked by the Second Great Awakening.
Preaching a postmillennial Arminian faith that formed the foundation of
Northern evangelicalism, they enthusiastically supported morally oriented
social movements such as temperance, Sabbatarianism, and education
reform. As in so many things, culturally blended central Illinois occupied a
11

For thoughtful analysis of the vision of Illinoisans and other inhabitants of the
“Great West” in this period, see WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS:
CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST (1991); JOHN K. LAUCK, THE LOST REGION:
TOWARDS A REVIVAL OF MIDWESTERN HISTORY (2013); KRISTIN L. HOGANSON,
THE HEARTLAND: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2019).
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moderate position and many of its citizens supported the well-established and
politically heterogenous Presbyterian, Methodist, and Episcopal churches.12
Although the native-born predominated, the state also contained an
increasingly influential population of immigrants and by 1850 they
accounted for 13 percent of Illinois’s population. Motivated to emigrate by
both economic and political factors, the state’s German-language speakers
generally came from middling backgrounds and had sufficient capital to
establish farms, workshops, and stores throughout the state. Although mostly
Catholic or Lutheran in their faith, a small contingent of free-thinking
intellectuals and professionals, exiled after the failed Revolutions of 1848,
would emerge as important leaders in this divided community. Impoverished
Irish Catholics, on the other hand, migrated en masse to work as canal diggers
and settled in Chicago where they emerged as one of the Democratic Party’s
most faithful constituencies.13
In the minds of many of Illinois’ native-born Protestants, the cultural,
political, and economic threats posed by this influx of immigrants
necessitated a decisive response. Suspicion of immigrants, especially of
Roman Catholics, had a long history in Illinois. Elijah Lovejoy, an
antislavery newspaper editor murdered by an anti-abolitionist mob in Alton
and brother of future radical Republican Owen Lovejoy, had ranted in the
1830s against “the hordes of ignorant, uneducated, vicious foreigners” who
12
For discussions on the economic and political implications of mid-century
theological debates see CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN
AMERICA, 1815-1846, at 393–95(1991); RICHARD CARWARDINE, LINCOLN: A LIFE
OF PURPOSE AND POWER 32–44 (2006); DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL
CULTURE OF AMERICAN WHIGS 166–67 (1979); DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT
HATH GOD WROUGHT 176–82 (2007). See also, STEPHEN L. HANSEN, THE MAKING
OF THE THIRD PARTY SYSTEM 60–67 (1980); W.F. Short, Early Religious Leaders
and Methods in Illinois, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE ILLINOIS STATE HISTORICAL
SOCIETY FOR THE YEAR 1902 56–62 (1902); Barton E. Price, Religion, Reform, and
Patriotism in Southern Illinois: A Case Study, 1852-1900, 107 J. ILL. STATE HIST.
SOC’Y 175–88 (2014).
13
For statistics on the Midwest’s foreign-born and Catholic populations, see
Ritter supra note 9, at 15–19. For helpful discussions of German immigrants and
politics in this period see Christina Bearden-White, Illinois Germans and the Coming
of the Civil War: Reshaping Ethnic Identity, 109 J. ILL. STATE HIST. SOC’Y 231–51
(2016); ALLISON CLARK EFFORD, GERMAN IMMIGRANTS, RACE, AND CITIZENSHIP IN
THE CIVIL WAR ERA (2013); BRUCE LEVINE, THE SPIRIT OF 1848: GERMAN
IMMIGRANTS, LABOR CONFLICT, AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (1992). For an
insightful discussion of the role of Irish immigrants in Chicago’s political culture see
Patricia Kelleher, Class and Catholic Irish Masculinity in Antebellum America:
Young Men on the Make in Chicago, 28 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 7–42 (2009).
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under the guidance of the Catholic Church were “calculated, fitted, and
intended to subvert our liberties.” Yet in the 1850s, as the number of foreignborn Illinoisans swelled well beyond anything Lovejoy might have predicted,
the nativist imperative to check the influence of immigrants took on a new
urgency.14
This impulse manifested itself in four separate arenas in Illinois in
the mid-1850s. First, evangelical Protestants sought to squelch cultural
aberration among immigrant groups by imposing strict Sabbath ordinances
that would prohibit the feasting and drinking popular among Irish Catholics
and Germans of all denominations. Closely connected to such efforts was an
attempt to adopt prohibition or the “Maine Law” and ban the production and
sale of intoxicating spirits. Some nativists sought to check the influence of
the foreign-born at the ballot box, by imposing restrictions on naturalized
citizens holding public offices and/or lengthening the waiting period for
naturalization. Finally, and most obliquely, many nativists supported the
establishment of public schools throughout the state, equipped with the
Protestant King James Bible as a textbook, in an effort to encourage the use
of the English language among Germans and check the growth of Catholic
parochial schools. The rapid emergence of the American or “Know Nothing”
Party served as the political engine for most of these measures.15
The introduction of the Nebraska Bill exacerbated existing tensions
within Illinois's long dominant Democratic Party. Although settled largely
14

Ritter, supra note 9, at 37.
Ritter, supra note 9, at 38–59. Prohibition measures received the title of
“Maine Law” following Maine’s adoption of the measure in 1851. The passage of
the law marked a major shift in the temperance movement, which had previously
relied on voluntary pledges of abstinence, using tactics of “moral suasion” similar to
that of abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison. For background see JACK S.
BLOCKER JR., AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENTS: CYCLES OF REFORM 54–60
(1989). Although native-born evangelical Protestants dominated the temperance and
Sabbatarian movements, they were joined throughout the Midwest by small groups
of pietistic Protestant immigrants, especially English and Welsh Methodists, Scottish
and Irish Presbyterians, Scandinavian Lutherans, and members of the Dutch
Reformed Church. This dynamic sometimes complicated the politics connecting
nativism, moral reform, and anti-Catholicism. For a thoughtful discussion of these
pietistic immigrants and their political affinities with native-born evangelicals see
PAUL KLEPPNER, THE CROSS OF CULTURE: A SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF MIDWESTERN
POLITICS, 1850-1900 84–89 (2ed.,1970). For background on the role of evangelical
Protestants in Northern political life, see Daniel Walker Howe, The Evangelical
Movement and Political Culture in the North During the Second Party System, 77 J.
AM. HIST. 1216–39 (1991); RICHARD J. CARWARDINE, EVANGELICALS AND POLITICS
IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 199–218 (2ed., 1997).
15
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by those of “Yankee” stock, Northern Illinois had remained competitive for
Democratic candidates, even after defections to the Free Soil ticket in 1848.
The Kansas-Nebraska Act, by opening free territory to the extension of
slavery, permanently alienated many of these one-time Jacksonians from the
Democracy. At the same time, Yankee Democrats had begun to join their
Whig cousins in expressing nativist views and campaigning on issues such
as temperance and anti-Catholicism. The dramatic success of the Chicago
Tribune as both an antislavery and anti-Catholic organ during this period
reveals the compatibility of these positions in the eyes of many readers. Such
a trend appeared elsewhere in the state as anti-Nebraska Democrat George T.
Brown of Alton championed temperance and Sabbatarianism before
becoming a firm opponent of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. On the other hand,
anti-extensionist immigrants, such as the German Democrat Gustave
Koerner, found themselves, for a time, alienated from both the national
Democracy and the new anti-Nebraska coalition.16
The process of realignment remained anything but straightforward.
Ethnic, religious, and cultural identities operated within a complex milieu of
partisan affinities and policy positions. Some anti-extensionist Whigs, such
as Abraham Lincoln, felt nothing but antipathy for political nativism even as
they maintained close alliances with Know Nothings. On the other hand,
some champions of temperance, nativism, and free schools ultimately
became loyal Douglas Democrats, such as Theodore S. Bowers of the Mount
Carmel Register. Throughout the debates of the following years, party
leaders of all stripes, as well as advocates of social reform, would try to
activate these various identities to mobilize the electorate in their favor.
Although the question of slavery extension would come to shape the politics
more than any other issue, this was not apparent to those living through the
events of 1854. No clear path forward existed amid the political tumult that
defined the months after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act as all
factions sought to bolster their conservative credentials and restore a
semblance of order, whether by reasserting the supremacy of the people
through popular sovereignty, restoring the Missouri Compromise as a

16

Thomas M. Keefe, Chicago’s Flirtation with Political Nativism, 1854-1856,
in 82 REC. AM. CATH. HIST. SOC’Y OF PHILA. 131, 131, 32 (1971); HANSEN, supra
note 12, at 54.
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“sacred compact,” or reimposing the cultural preeminence of Protestant
Anglo-Saxons.17
The last goal preceded the introduction of the Nebraska Bill. Back in
November 1853, George T. Brown’s Democratic Alton Courier featured an
editorial denouncing the indifference of German immigrants to American
observance of the Sabbath. For Brown, the United States was “superior to
Germany in very many respects” with the “general observance of the Sabbath
as one instance of that superiority.” 18 A subsequent convention of
Sabbatarians held across the state in White County declared that “the
continued prosperity of the nation in civil and religious liberty, depends upon
the recognition and sanctification of the sabbath.”19 While such sentiments
might appear hyperbolic for twenty-first-century Americans, for believers in
17

Historians have offered a variety of interpretations for the collapse of the
Second Party System and subsequent realignment in Illinois. The traditional position
places the question of slavery’s extension at the heart of the realignment. See DON
E. FEHRENBACHER, PRELUDE TO GREATNESS: LINCOLN IN THE 1850S (Stanford
University Press ed., 1st ed. 1962). The so-called “ethnocultural” and “geographical”
interpretations, notably advanced by Paul Kleppner and Stephen L. Hansen,
respectively, and supported to varying extents by the work of Michael F. Holt,
William E. Gienapp, and Joel H. Silbey, emphasize religious, linguistic, and cultural
divisions between pietists, liturgists, Yankees, immigrants, and Southerners as
leading factors. See PAUL KLEPPNER, THE THIRD ELECTORAL SYSTEM, 1853-1892:
PARTIES, VOTERS, AND POLITICAL CULTURES (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press ed., 1979); HANSEN, supra note 12; MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE
POLITICAL CRISIS OF THE 1850S, at 175–181 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ed., 1978);
WILLIAM E. GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 1852-1856 (Oxford
University Press, Inc. 1987); JOEL H. SILBEY, THE PARTISAN IMPERATIVE: THE
DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN POLITICS BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (New York: Oxford
University Press ed., 1985). Recent literature has largely returned to the traditional
“fundamentalist” interpretation but acknowledges the role of ethnocultural issues
and geography. See Bruce Levine, Conservatism, Nativism, and Slavery: Thomas R.
Whitney and the Origins of the Know-Nothing Party, 88 J. AM. HIST. 455–588
(2001); ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN
SLAVERY 72, 73 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. ed., 2010); Bruce Levine, “The
Vital Element of the Republican Party”: Antislavery, Nativism, and Abraham
Lincoln, 1 J. CIVIL WAR ERA 481–505 ( 2011); James L. Hutson, The Illinois
Political Realignment of 1844-1860: Revisiting the Analysis, 1 J. CIV. WAR ERA 506
– 535 (2011); GRAHAM A. PECK, MAKING AN ANTISLAVERY NATION: STEPHEN A.
DOUGLAS AND THE NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC ORIGINS OF THE KANSAS-NEBRASKA
ACT, 1849-1854, at 97, 105–07 (University of Illinois Press ed., 2017).
18
The Sabbath – The German – A Challenge, ALTON DAILY MORNING COURIER
(Ill.), Nov. 7, 1853, at 2.
19
Resolutions of the Convention, MOUNT CARMEL REGISTER (Ill.), July 19,
1854, at 2.
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a sovereign God, the dangers posed by violating the Fourth Commandment
appeared all too apparent. Indeed, in late 1854 another Sabbatarian
convention would announce that such “a fearful amount of Sabbath
desecration” as occurred in their midst was “calculated to bring down the
judgments of Heaven; not only upon individuals but upon the nation at
large.”20 By dishonoring the Sabbath with drinking, carousing, and feasting,
immigrants posed an immediate threat to the United States’ covenant with
Divine Providence.21
Liquor dealers facilitated these Sunday shenanigans, as well as
darker scenes of perpetual drunkenness and inebriated violence that haunted
the poor of all backgrounds. Reformers took aim at grog sellers using the
same language of republicanism that anti-extensionists had applied to
Southern slaveholders. In March 1854, the Mount Carmel Register attacked
liquor sellers as “the aristocracy of America,” acting with impunity in their
own interest against the will of the community.22 By profiting off of vice and
releasing intoxicated hordes, the Chicago Tribune denounced the “Whiskey
interest” and their allies in the Democratic Party for forming an “engine to
perpetuate drunkenness and crime.” 23 Widespread support for temperance
among the “respectable” middle classes put pro-liquor Democrats on the
defensive, and they did their best to separate temperance from partisanship.
The pro-Nebraska Rock Island Republican objected “to the spasmodic efforts
of defunct whiggery to galvanize itself into motion by hanging on to the tails
of the temperance men.”24 The Republican rightly feared that members of the
opposition had garnered support from their stance on temperance, but
liquor’s most fervent opponents did not rally under the Whig banner.25
Instead, they took up the cause of the Know Nothings, also known
as the Native Americans, who emerged as a political force from the shadows
of semi-secret fraternal lodges. These political nativists linked immigration,
drunkenness, and sabbath breaking as part of a grand anti-republican
conspiracy formulated by the Roman Catholic Church. Under the direction
20

Sabbath Convention of South-Eastern Illinois, MOUNT CARMEL REGISTER
(Ill.), Dec. 27, 1854, at 1.
21
Id. The numbering of the Ten Commandments remains disputed among
Christians. Most Protestants consider the command “Remember the sabbath day, to
keep it holy” as the Fourth Commandment. Roman Catholics and Lutherans consider
this to be the Third Commandment.
22
Editorial, MOUNT CARMEL REGISTER, Mar. 15, 1854, at 2.
23
Politics in Indiana, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 7, 1854, at 2.
24
The Rock Island Weekly Argus, DAILY REPUBLICAN (Ill.), Apr. 5, 1854, at 2.
25
Id.
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of the Roman Pontiff, devious priests and an ignorant laity had begun to
undermine both Protestantism and liberty throughout the United States.
Springfield’s Know Nothing organ, the Weekly Capital Enterprise, declared
that “No American who employs an Irish servant is beyond the reach of
Jesuitical spies.” 26 Drawing on a long tradition of Anglo-American antiCatholicism that dated back to the colonial period, the Know Nothings
insisted that Catholicism encouraged idolatry, superstition, and devotion to a
rigid hierarchy that would undermine rational Protestantism and AngloSaxon liberty. The Church’s “treacherous and devilish” lackeys would stop
at nothing for “the advancement of the papal power” and inevitably bring
about “the downfall of the liberties of the people.”27 Although the Roman
Catholic Church remained a prominent force of reactionary antirepublicanism in Europe, American Catholics worked hard to balance the
commitments of their faith with their duties as American citizens. Absolutely
no evidence existed for a coordinated plot by the Church’s hierarchy.28
Beyond their religious bigotry, the new nativist party also tapped into
a strain of anti-partisan partisanship that resonated with a broad swath to the
electorate. The Know Nothings, by adopting the title of “American” as their
formal party label had hoped to rise above the party squabbles that they
believed had driven the country to the brink of disaster. Winfield Scott’s
effort to court Irish-American voters in the presidential election of 1852 had
appalled nativist Whigs, while the waning of Jacksonian-Era economic
disputes and a perception of complacency and corruption within the
Democracy fueled a sense of alienation among some Northern Democrats.
As the national bonds that had held Whiggery together snapped, many hoped
that nativist patriotism could cleanse American republicanism of its profane
heresies. Opposed to both the Southern Fire-Eaters and the immigrant
profligates who stood poised to dominate the nation politically, the Know
Nothings hoped to “purify the politics of country,” “refine its nationality,”
and foster “true patriotism.” 29 As aptly explained by one historian of
26
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Northern Know Nothingism, the party “insisted that only ignorant foreigners
could be duped by the outrageous promises of this cunning new breed of
politician” that had emerged from the slaveholder dominated Democratic
Party.30
For the most part in 1854 midterms, the incipient Know Nothings
joined forces with other opponents of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in a loose
“Fusion” movement. In the one statewide contest, for State Treasurer, the
Fusion ticket backed James Miller, a Know Nothing and fierce opponent of
slavery. In other places throughout the state, the Know Nothings backed antiNebraska Whigs. For example, Lincoln managed to secure the endorsement
of Benjamin S. Edwards of Springfield, Sangamon County’s leading nativist,
to support Richard Yates’s bid for reelection to Congress.31
Throughout the state, the Fusion movement received broad support
from voters but remained fractured politically. The anti-Nebraska coalition
won some fifty-five percent of the vote statewide in the congressional
contests, securing five of the state’s nine districts, but lost the contest for
State Treasurer. The nomination of Miller had alienated anti-extensionist
Germans who split their tickets in order to vote against a Know Nothing.
Although some ninety percent of German-Americans had voted for
Democrats in 1852, they now split 70-30 for anti-Nebraskites who had no
connection with nativism. But on the other hand, nativist voters had
uniformly voted against pro-Nebraska Democrats. Thus, although many
voices cried out against slavery extension, it appeared as if the anti-Nebraska
Fusion men would be forced to choose between siding with either the
politically powerful Know Nothings or the state’s significant German
population, which had largely opposed the Kansas-Nebraska Act.32

III.

NATIVISTS IN OFFICE

Throughout the first half of 1855, rather than compromising and
coalescing, the anti-Nebraska forces further divided. The surge among
political nativists and moral reformers evident in the preceding months
reached a crescendo as this self-identified conservative force, having voiced
30
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its support for the Missouri Compromise, sought to restore order and
evangelical morality in the face of immigrant opposition. Although by no
means a monolith, the pro-temperance and anti-Catholic Know Nothings
proved sufficiently organized at the local and state levels to rapidly advance
their legislative agenda. Chicago’s “Lager Beer” Riot, the passage of a
statewide public-school law, and the narrow failure of a prohibition
referendum showcased further divisions within Illinois’s body politic.33
The Chicago municipal elections of March 1855 offered the city’s
energized political nativists a chance to flex their newfound political muscle.
A year earlier, they had lamented how “the Whiskey Party” aided by the
“enemies of Free Schools and Political and Religious Liberty” could triumph
over “Morality and Religion.” Now, by electing their candidate for Mayor,
Levi Boone, over the Democratic incumbent, along with a slate of other city
officials on a prohibitionist and nativist platform, the Know Nothings hoped
to realize their vision of a virtuous Christian society. Indeed, in his inaugural
address, Boone promised to ensure that the city would “become as eminent
for its moral characters as it is for the commercial facilities and material
resources with which the lavish hand of a beneficent Providence has crowned
it.”34 Explicitly excluding Catholics from his vision of the city’s new birth,
he denounced the Church as “a powerful politico-religious organization”
devoted “to the temporal, as well as the spiritual supremacy of a foreign
despot” which sought “universal dominion over this land… by coercion and
at the cost of blood itself.”35 Boone made the reorganization of Chicago’s
police force a top priority putting uniformed cops on the streets for the first
time as he built an army for his moral majority that could crack down on the
city’s immigrant-dominated saloons, beer halls, and gambling houses.36
In April, this effort to restore “law and order” led to a violent civil
disturbance throughout the city. Although Boone had voiced his opposition
to issuing any liquor licenses and supported the looming statewide
referendum on prohibition, the city government initially pursued a policy of
limiting access to alcohol by raising the cost of liquor licenses and closing
by-the-drink establishments on Sundays. As Boone said in his inaugural, the
city had “long been disgraced and the holy Sabbath profaned” by Sunday
33
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liquor sales. 37 But the Know Nothings administration underestimated the
ferocious opposition they would meet from the city’s immigrant population,
particularly by the Germans, who regarded drinking beer on Sunday as a
perfectly respectable activity. On April 21, an angry crowd of Germans
gathered in front of the city’s Clark Street courthouse to demand the release
of nineteen saloonkeepers imprisoned for either failing to pay the new fee or
for continuing to serve alcohol on Sundays. In response, Mayor Boone called
out the city’s new police force of 80 native-born officers to break up the
crowd and deputized 150 more men to reinforce them. The clash which
followed, known as the “Lager Beer Riot,” left at least one immigrant dead
and dozens severely injured. The police arrested a group of 60 men, mostly
working-class Germans, and Boone mustered the militia and placed the city
under martial law.38
The press throughout the state reacted divisively to the violence
along both cultural and partisan lines. The Chicago Tribune castigated the
“Lager Beer swilling and Sabbath breaking Germans” and hailed the effort
to enforce the law “against their low, drunkard, pauper making whiskey and
beer shops.” 39 Downstate, George T. Brown’s Alton Courier, though still
identifying as a Democratic paper, labeled the riot as “the fruits of the
agitation which the Chicago Liquor dealers have been so industriously and
unscrupulously endeavoring to raise.”40 The prohibitionist and anti-Catholic
Moline Workman also applauded the “bravery of the policemen” in the face
“of a most disgraceful riot.”41 The pro-Douglas Daily Republican of Rock
Island, on the other hand, blamed “know nothing rowdies and Maine
Lawites” for their “relentless war of proscription and persecution” which
represented a “tide of fanaticism and treason.” 42 The Republican’s editor
John B. Danforth called on the “sober, right-minded people, who love their
country and the principles of their fathers” to stem the tide of dogmatic
bigotry.43 Less bombastically, the Dewitt Courier blamed the violence on
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“the over officiousness of the city officers.” 44 These, and many other
accounts, tied the events in Chicago to recent legislation passed in
Springfield which promised to implement a free school system throughout
the state and enact a prohibition law, pending the result of a statewide
referendum.
State support for prohibition and public schools marked a triumph
for evangelicalism. By drying out the state and herding ignorant immigrant
children into schools infused with a strong dose of Protestant theology, the
legislators hoped to restore order to a society overtaken by idleness and
debauchery. Catholic immigrants and many native-born Illinoisans with
Southern backgrounds staunchly opposed both measures as a coercive
overreach by Yankee idealists. A host of others, including Protestant
immigrants and less pious voters born in the free states, tended to support
public schools but waffled on the so-called “Maine Law.” The new Free
School law required localities to provide tax support for a common school
instead of allowing each county to decide the issue for itself. Since many
areas of Northern Illinois already featured competition between locally
established public schools and Catholic parochial schools, Southern Illinois
voiced the strongest opposition to the measure. Yet, given that similar
legislation had easily passed throughout the other free states, the measure
provoked little controversy relative to the prohibition measure. The June
referendum on that issue galvanized many voters, including the Democrats
who had sat out the previous fall’s congressional elections out of frustration
with the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Although support for liquor consumption, per
se, remained rare, opposition to prohibition’s enforcement, or as the Cairo
City Times put it, to the creation of a “tyrannical, dangerous, or cruel police
authority” whose excesses might match “the decrees of Robespierre and his
associates of France,” appealed to those skeptical of replacing a familiar
problem with an unknown evil. 45 In the end, a coalition of Southern and
Illinois born voters united with nearly all eligible Irish and German
immigrants to decisively defeat the measure with fifty-four percent of voters
opposing a dry Illinois. 46
44
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Though the defeat of prohibition owed as much to a lack of
enthusiasm among some of the native-born as to the machinations of either
immigrants or alcohol dealers, the Moline Workman bemoaned that Illinois
was “no longer the land of milk and honey—but of whiskey outrage and
murder” as a “great ocean of rum” had overwhelmed the state. 47 Deeply
frustrated by the result of the vote, temperance advocates would abandon
prohibition efforts for the foreseeable future. The nativist coalition that had
rallied in support of the measure also began to fracture. But their brief
moment in the sun had immeasurably complicated the task of building a
permanent coalition in opposition to slavery’s extension. As political factions
split, re-aligned and split again, adversaries, became allies, became
adversaries again. Each party and sub-party hoped to preserve its own vision
of American liberty in the face of a radicalized opposition, but in mid-1855
few could point out which radicals posed the greatest threat.48

IV.

THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL FUSION

By early 1856, many of the Illinois Whigs who had joined Know
Nothing lodges wondered whether they could maintain their opposition to
the Kansas-Nebraska Act and still succeed on the state and national levels as
an independent nativist party. In 1855, the state Know Nothing Party had
called for a restoration of the Missouri Compromise, but in February 1856,
the Know Nothing national convention had bypassed the slavery question
and nominated former President Millard Fillmore, a champion of the
Compromise of 1850 and the last Whig to hold the nation’s highest office.
Fillmore himself had a lukewarm commitment to nativism and this
ambivalence, combined with his failure to call for a repeal of the KansasNebraska Act, led some Northern Know Nothings to reject his candidacy.
Still, for those intensely concerned with the Disunion conspiracy, like the
Know Nothings of central Illinois, Fillmore’s candidacy proved quite
appealing.49
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Meanwhile, even after a year of continuous agitation against the
extension of slavery, Illinois’s anti-extension forces remained factious and
divided along old partisan and sociocultural lines. Recognizing that
competing tickets would result in disaster in statewide contests, a group of
self-identified conservative leaders began to lead a movement to unite on
their mutual antipathy towards slavery’s expansion into Kansas. Culminating
at the Bloomington Convention of May 1856, the newly minted Illinois
Republicans took a defensive posture against Southern aggression. Bolstered
by the recent attacks on Lawrence, Kansas and Senator Charles Sumner by
proslavery extremists, the Republicans attracted those Know Nothings who
distrusted Fillmore. Douglas and his Democratic supporters, for their part,
rejected the Republicans as incendiaries willing to risk disunion for free soil
and maintained that popular sovereignty provided a reasonable antislavery
solution. Exposed to both arguments, undecided voters in Illinois, wavering
Democrats, Know Nothings, and ex-Whigs alike, balanced their genuine
dislike of slavery with suspicion of abolitionist agitation and fear of disunion.
Unfortunately for the Illinois Republicans, suspicion surrounded the
party’s presidential nominee, former army explorer John C. Frémont.
Although both American-born Protestants, John Frémont and his wife Jessie
had eloped in 1841 with the help of a Roman Catholic priest, a fact that—
along with John Frémont’s French-Canadian heritage—rang alarm bells in
the ears of anti-Catholic nativists. The Democrats took advantage of
Frémont’s relative obscurity to tar him with a variety of blatantly false and
contradictory charges. Recognizing the tenuous and sometimes conflicting
elements of the Republican coalition, they hoped to alienate at least one of
the party’s key constituencies through this campaign of misinformation.50
Thus, Democrats accused the Republicans of a plot “to degrade the alienborn white man” 51 and also lambasted them for “laying drunk in beer
saloons…to fool the ignorant laboring Dutchman.”52 As a result, Republican
organs found themselves in the strange position of simultaneously denying
Frémont’s status as “a Know Nothing or Catholic, an Abolitionist or a
slaveholder.”53

50

ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN, 248–50 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, USA, 1995); GIENAPP, supra note 17, at 316–29; HOLT, supra note
17, at 175–81.
51
The Germans on Thursday, ILL. STATE REG., Sept. 20, 1856 at 1.
52
Produce Your Evidence, ROCK ISLAND ARGUS (Ill.), Aug. 1, 1856, at 2.
53
THE MOLINE WORKMAN (Ill.), Aug. 20, 1856 at 2.

2022]

“Purifying Politics”: Illinois Know Nothings

475

While the Republicans largely succeeded in swinging the Know
Nothings of northern Illinois into the Republican column, local leaders
recognized that central Illinois would determine the election’s outcome and
worked tirelessly to co-opt conservative ex-Whigs inclined towards Fillmore.
In Greene County, William Herndon—Lincoln’s law partner—and exCongressman Richard Yates negotiated a truce with Know Nothing activist
Jim Matheny so that both factions would advocate for anti-extension policies.
Lincoln himself wrote to many leading Fillmore supporters urging them to
throw their support behind Frémont. Presenting a pragmatic plan for limited
cooperation, Lincoln explained that by supporting the Republicans and
depriving James Buchanan of Illinois, the Know Nothings could potentially
send the election to the House of Representatives—where Fillmore might
emerge triumphant as a compromise candidate.54
In a case that highlighted a generational divide among former Whigs,
Republican William H. Bailhache of the Illinois State Journal sought to
convince his father, John Bailhache, the former editor of the Alton Telegraph
to shift his support from Fillmore to Frémont. The younger Bailhache
acknowledged that he too “would have preferred Fillmore as a candidate” as
would have “a large number of the delegates” to Philadelphia, but he insisted
that Frémont’s “record is a good one” and hoped that the young hero might
take on a role like Zachary Taylor, the last Whig to win the White House.55
Yet while the elder Bailhache would write to his fellow Old Line Whigs
denouncing defections to Buchanan and backed Bissell for Governor, he
remained in Fillmore’s camp. In an effort to cultivate goodwill, William
Henry Bailhache even assisted in the establishment of a pro-Fillmore
newspaper in Springfield. He apparently believed that the Fillmore campaign
would do more harm to Buchanan than Frémont and, as evidenced in late
October letters with his father, hoped that the Fillmore men would switch
candidates at the last moment. Despite these efforts, ex-Know Nothing
William B. Archer recognized that “the friends of Fillmore [would] not come
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over” to the Republicans thanks to Frémont’s association with Catholicism
and the increasing number of German-born Republicans.56
Fillmore supporters sought to step into the breach by making the case
that their candidate offered the only hope for national reconciliation and
revival. The Fillmore campaign paper William H. Bailhache had assisted, the
Conservative, largely targeted the Democrats, denouncing “the present
imbecile administration” for its “repeal of the Missouri Compromise” and
“reopening the slavery agitation which had been closed by the Compromises
of 1820 and 1850.”57 Yet, it also lambasted “Republican madness and folly”
alongside “Locofoco corruption” and attempted to sow doubt into the minds
of Old Line Whigs leaning towards the Republicans by suggesting that the
conservative favorite Supreme Court Justice John McLean favored Fillmore
over Frémont. 58 With the statewide Know Nothing Party in disarray, and
resolved, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, to support Bissell in the
gubernatorial contest, the Fillmorites claimed the mantle of disinterested
patriots who stood apart from party. Drawing on a tendency among Whigs
identified by Daniel Walker Howe “to think of themselves as nonpartisan
defenders of reason against the passions of the crowd”59 the pro-Fillmore
forces to position their candidate as arrayed against “sectional parties” who
represented “the wildest and most dangerous passions.”60 In the campaign’s
final days, the Conservative appealed to the “many good and true men, whose
every impulse is patriotic” who planned to vote for Frémont to reject the
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“designing demagogues” and “abolitionists” who led the Republicans at the
national level in favor of “Fillmore and the Constitution.”61
In the end, while Democrat James Buchanan secured only 44.1
percent of the vote, the opposition split between Frémont, with 40.2 percent,
and Fillmore, with 15.7 percent.62
Lincoln recognized that for the Republicans to win Illinois in a
Presidential race, they would need to secure this cohort of Fillmore voters.
The party had already managed to draw most of these voters to their cause in
the state and local races, as the Republicans elected their nominee for
governor, William Bissell, and ex-Know Nothing James Miller, for State
Treasurer, by comfortable margins. In the coming two election cycles,
Lincoln employed his considerable power of persuasion to convince Know
Nothing voters that the Republicans best reflected their worldview without
personally engaging in nativist harangues.
V.

KNOW NOTHINGS AND THE SLAVE POWER CONSPIRACY

In the months following the election of 1856, two critical
developments increased the credibility of the “Slave Power Conspiracy” and
Lincoln used these events to reframe his message in terms reminiscent of the
paranoid style. In early 1857, the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v.
Sanford outraged those who had worked to restore the Missouri
Compromise. Enslaved by an army surgeon named John Emerson, Dred
Scott had followed Emerson to his posts in the free state of Illinois and in the
free territory of what would become Minnesota. Bringing suit against
Emerson’s widow in 1846, Scott argued that his residence on free soil had,
in fact, freed him and his family. Gradually working its way through the court
system in the succeeding decade, Dred Scott’s case had placed profound
questions of Black rights and the constitutionality of slavery in the territories
before the Supreme Court. In an infamous majority opinion issued just two
days after Buchanan’s ascension to the presidency, Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney not only denied that Scott had a right to sue in Federal court on the
basis of his race but claimed that any congressional restriction of slavery in
the territories violated the rights to property enjoyed by all U.S. citizens
under the Bill of Rights. Ignoring decades of precedent and brazenly
dismissing public opinion, Taney retroactively nullified the Missouri
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Compromise of 1820 and declared the Republican Party’s chief plank
unconstitutional. Taney added that territorial legislatures, as the creations of
Congress, could not act against slavery either. Only when a territory drafted
its state constitution and applied for admission to the Union could it choose
to restrict, limit, or prohibit slavery. Overtly partisan and sectional, the
decision cut down the positions of both the Republicans and most Northern
Democrats in one fell swoop. 63 Amid a rumor that President-elect James
Buchanan had pressured the justices to rule broadly against Scott (a
speculation subsequently confirmed by historians), the Republicans
denounced both Buchanan and Chief Justice Roger B. Taney.
The Illinois Republican press, shocked by Taney’s audacity and
appalled by the decision’s implications, interpreted the Dred Scott decision
as an overt attempt by slaveholders and their Northern lackeys to establish
slavery throughout the West. The Belvidere Standard argued that by
extending the reach of slavery, Taney had reversed “the policy of the brave
and liberty-loving spirits who founded this Republic.” 64 Convinced that
Buchanan, who had alluded to the decision in his inaugural address, had
influenced the decision, the Chicago Tribune railed that “by this
conspiracy…the leaders of the sham Democratic party” had despoiled the
Constitution and left “its very life-blood sucked out of it.”65 Reflecting its
Jacksonian heritage, “Long” John Wentworth’s Chicago Democrat saw the
decision as a dangerous step towards centralization, an “encroachment upon
State rights and State sovereignty” animated by “the spirit of federalism.”66
Some former Whig papers also understood the decision as a threat to
Northern state sovereignty, darkly forecasting that a future decision of the
63
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court might extend slavery into all states. As the Pantagraph of Bloomington
explained, “one little step only remains; to decide all State prohibitions of
slavery to be void” thus completing the “enslavement” of the free white
North to the Slave Power.67
Although no evidence existed to support the Republican claim that
the South hoped to extend slavery into the free states, their fear appears more
rational when placed into a broader context. Even as they took up elements
of the so-called “paranoid style,” indicting their opponents as conspirators
set on undermining the Constitution and American liberty, in their own
minds, Illinois Republicans had good reason to fear the encroachment of
slavery. In a few short years, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, the
disintegration of the Second Party System, and the violence of “Bleeding
Kansas” had overturned decades of sectional accommodation. As territory
reserved for freedom became a domain for slavery and as slaveholders
asserted their “rights” by shedding the blood of white Northerners on the
plains of Kansas and in the halls of Congress, Republicans felt increasingly
under siege.
Still overwhelmingly committed to preserving the constitutional
status quo and co-equal status of the three branches of government some
Republicans dismissed Taney’s ruling on slavery in the territories as obiter
dictum, and thus did not directly assault the authority of the Supreme Court.
Yet, most Illinois Republicans also recognized that to regain control of the
court and reverse the decision they would need to enlarge their coalition and
win victories at the ballot box. Without a change on the high bench, George
T. Brown of the Alton Courier predicted that the Supreme Court would
continue to advance the “grand conspiracy against freedom” and “in any
future controversy before their tribunal” would “carry the doctrine of the
supremacy of slavery much further.” 68 In Springfield, the editors of the
Illinois State Journal hoped that this Democratic overreach might draw
Fillmore voters into the Republican fold, gleefully noting “a revolution
among the American Party papers” in the East as previously mild opponents
of the Kansas-Nebraska Act now firmly committed themselves to preventing
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slavery’s extension. 69 The Waukegan Gazette noted that with slavery
effectively nationalized by the Supreme Court, “nothing but public sentiment
now hinders the slaveholder from going into any of the territories or States
of this Union, and holding his slaves there.”70 The state’s Republicans could
only hope that public outrage would continue to run hot and “melt the mass
of the people into one great irresistible party of freedom.”71
Several months later, Buchanan pressured Democratic majorities in
Congress to admit Kansas into the Union as a slave state, despite massive
electoral irregularities and overwhelming evidence that the majority of actual
settlers favored a free-soil policy. Although this measure proved too far for
Douglas, ever the champion of popular sovereignty, Lincoln used these
developments to frame Douglas and his Democratic allies as either coconspirators or dupes in a grand plot to undermine freedom and install
slavery nationally. In his famous debates against Douglas during the 1858
Illinois Senate race, Lincoln outlined the issue through the metaphor of
building a house:
We cannot absolutely know that all these exact adaptations
are the result of preconcert. But when we see a lot of framed
timbers, different portions of which we know have been
gotten out at different times and places and by different
workmen—Stephen, Franklin, Roger, and James, for
instance—and when we see these timbers joined together,
and see they exactly make the frame of a house or a mill, all
the tenons and mortices exactly fitting, and all the lengths
and proportions of the different pieces exactly adapted to
their respective places…we feel it impossible not to believe
that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all
understood one another from the beginning, and all worked
upon a common plan or draft drawn up before the first lick
was struck.72
Intimating a conspiracy between Douglas, former President Franklin Pierce,
Chief Justice Taney, and President Buchanan, Lincoln hoped to convince the
public that the Slave Power and its agents bore responsibility for dividing the
nation. This argument countered the claim advanced by Douglas, that
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Lincoln was an abolitionist fellow traveler and would assist Southern radicals
in tearing the Union apart. Although neither case had much merit on a factual
basis, by appealing to the Slave Power and Disunion conspiracies, both
Lincoln and Douglas appealed to the worldview of Know Nothings who, left
without an independent party after 1856, represented the key swing vote.73
Although Lincoln never publicly tied the Slave Power conspiracy to
Catholicism, this did not prevent his allies from doing so. In Springfield,
Lincoln’s political organ, the Illinois State Journal, claimed in the 1858
campaign that “Popery and Slavery have been the hard masters of the
American people” and that this insidious force would “proscribe and beat
down Americans because they were born on American soil, and because they
would not yield allegiance to those of Rome.”74 This anti-Catholic baiting
continued after the election, as the widely read Chicago Tribune added a
measure of anti-Semitism to the mix by condemning the “Catholicised
Slaveocratic party” that led “the Hebrew Democrat” to be “ruled at the ballot
box by the Pope’s minions.” 75 Although this vitriol likely offended some
Republican voters, it appealed to many more who saw the Democratic Party
as a corrupt organization headed by slaveholders and intent on perpetuating
its own power through fraudulent immigrant votes. Indeed, even Lincoln had
noted his fear that “Celtic gentlemen, with black carpet-sacks in their hands”
might appear throughout swing districts to steal the election.76
This corruption angle became a principal plank in the Republican
Platform in 1860, as Lincoln ran for President on a platform committed to
limiting the power of the Slave Power and “arrest[ing] the systematic plunder
of the public treasury by favored partisans.”77 The moniker of “Honest Abe”
appealed to those frustrated by startling revelations of corruption within the
Buchanan administration. Although Douglas also positioned himself as an
outsider, emphasizing his break with Buchanan, he remained a Democrat
married to a Roman Catholic and a champion of immigrant voters. Douglas
did his best to position himself as a defender of Union and order against
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sectional extremism, but in Illinois, as in the other key border North states of
Indiana and Pennsylvania, a majority of the Know Nothing swing voters
found Lincoln more convincing. According to the analysis of historian
William E. Gienapp, Lincoln won the support of 74 percent of the state’s
former Fillmore voters in 1860. Carefully walking the line between two
antagonistic constituencies, Lincoln also managed to win over Protestant
immigrants, including a key cohort of Illinois’s German-born population.78
In the months that followed, as Southern states seceded and
inaugurated a civil war by bombarding Fort Sumter, both constituencies
would rally behind Lincoln to defend the Union and prevent the Slave Power
from destroying the world’s “last best hope.” Contrary to what we might
otherwise like to believe in the twenty-first century, the Republican victory
in 1860 and the subsequent Union victory in the Civil War, depended on the
support of one-time Know Nothings.
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